fix: reject hard-linked project files and verify retained Windows proposals

This commit is contained in:
Agent Workbench Dev
2026-10-30 23:32:09 +08:00
parent f4bd0ad8dc
commit 7b1f529ed6
6 changed files with 273 additions and 3 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
{
"at": "2026-10-30T15:14:23.779Z",
"directory": "D:\\Ai-project\\REA逆向\\Agent-Workbench\\.qa\\milestone-hardlink-gwRZXi",
"links": 2,
"modelFileReadContainsOwnedMarker": true,
"error": null,
"inspectionRulesContainOwnedMarker": true,
"realCredentials": "none; owned marker only"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
TAP version 13
# warning: in the working copy of 'README.md', LF will be replaced by CRLF the next time Git touches it
# warning: in the working copy of 'src/two.mjs', LF will be replaced by CRLF the next time Git touches it
# Subtest: sealed batches preserve bytes until review, then apply and explicitly restore BOM/CRLF/new files
ok 1 - sealed batches preserve bytes until review, then apply and explicitly restore BOM/CRLF/new files
---
duration_ms: 2041.7263
type: 'test'
...
# Switched to a new branch 'owner-branch'
# Subtest: a conflict in the last file or Git branch prevents writing every file in the batch
ok 2 - a conflict in the last file or Git branch prevents writing every file in the batch
---
duration_ms: 2812.9693
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: duplicate canonical paths, ancestor collisions, links, dependencies and Windows aliases never form a batch
ok 3 - duplicate canonical paths, ancestor collisions, links, dependencies and Windows aliases never form a batch
---
duration_ms: 1009.9288
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: fingerprints, changed proposals and corrupt snapshot artifacts cannot write or restore any target
ok 4 - fingerprints, changed proposals and corrupt snapshot artifacts cannot write or restore any target
---
duration_ms: 2350.9921
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: a failure after replacement restores only batch bytes and never retries an old application
ok 5 - a failure after replacement restores only batch bytes and never retries an old application
---
duration_ms: 1833.9048
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: rollback preserves owner edits, blocks other project writers, and explicit acknowledgement releases recovery
ok 6 - rollback preserves owner edits, blocks other project writers, and explicit acknowledgement releases recovery
---
duration_ms: 2479.6809
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: an unattempted owner-created file identical to a suggestion remains external and is never removed
ok 7 - an unattempted owner-created file identical to a suggestion remains external and is never removed
---
duration_ms: 1837.4294
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: active batch requests are serialized and cancellation leaves a verifiable ended batch
ok 8 - active batch requests are serialized and cancellation leaves a verifiable ended batch
---
duration_ms: 1958.5244
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: batch application and rollback preserve unrelated Git index and worktree bytes
ok 9 - batch application and rollback preserve unrelated Git index and worktree bytes
---
duration_ms: 3201.692
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: recovery reuses exact staged bytes but retains a conflicting temporary file for owner inspection
ok 10 - recovery reuses exact staged bytes but retains a conflicting temporary file for owner inspection
---
duration_ms: 1784.9568
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: one Task can seal pending proposals from earlier Runs while snapshots retain each source Run
ok 11 - one Task can seal pending proposals from earlier Runs while snapshots retain each source Run
---
duration_ms: 1371.4633
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: model code tools keep Task/Run ownership, index evidence and exact proposals across storage recovery
ok 12 - model code tools keep Task/Run ownership, index evidence and exact proposals across storage recovery
---
duration_ms: 4195.5662
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: bundled code APIs isolate project results, validate queries and create review-only patches with conflicts
ok 13 - bundled code APIs isolate project results, validate queries and create review-only patches with conflicts
---
duration_ms: 1952.8462
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: code tool arguments reject malformed ownership-independent inputs before side effects
ok 14 - code tool arguments reject malformed ownership-independent inputs before side effects
---
duration_ms: 0.5327
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: hard-link aliases cannot expose protected bytes through reads, proposals, inventory or automatic project rules
ok 15 - hard-link aliases cannot expose protected bytes through reads, proposals, inventory or automatic project rules
---
duration_ms: 765.9297
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: ambiguous project hard links are explicit and ordinary independent file copies remain readable
ok 16 - ambiguous project hard links are explicit and ordinary independent file copies remain readable
---
duration_ms: 703.696
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: proposals preserve project bytes until review; apply backs up the exact original bytes
ok 17 - proposals preserve project bytes until review; apply backs up the exact original bytes
---
duration_ms: 933.708
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: new nested files are created only on apply and unchanged content creates no proposal
ok 18 - new nested files are created only on apply and unchanged content creates no proposal
---
duration_ms: 733.1599
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: stale reads and changed baselines are rejected without overwriting external edits
ok 19 - stale reads and changed baselines are rejected without overwriting external edits
---
duration_ms: 770.629
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: file paths reject traversal, absolute paths, credentials and outside junctions
ok 20 - file paths reject traversal, absolute paths, credentials and outside junctions
---
duration_ms: 831.413
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: read and search expose bounded text scopes and reject non UTF-8 / oversized files
ok 21 - read and search expose bounded text scopes and reject non UTF-8 / oversized files
---
duration_ms: 695.127
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: project-local junctions cannot expose or create protected Git and credential files
ok 22 - project-local junctions cannot expose or create protected Git and credential files
---
duration_ms: 957.424
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: Windows trailing-dot and trailing-space path aliases cannot bypass protected paths
ok 23 - Windows trailing-dot and trailing-space path aliases cannot bypass protected paths
---
duration_ms: 749.6176
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: exact patches preserve BOM/CRLF, unicode and all unselected bytes and back up the original on apply
ok 24 - exact patches preserve BOM/CRLF, unicode and all unselected bytes and back up the original on apply
---
duration_ms: 783.3927
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: several patches are matched against one original snapshot in any input order and keep LF
ok 25 - several patches are matched against one original snapshot in any input order and keep LF
---
duration_ms: 1116.5668
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: mixed line endings require exact anchors and preserve untouched formatting
ok 26 - mixed line endings require exact anchors and preserve untouched formatting
---
duration_ms: 844.7789
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: ambiguous, overlapping, missing and malformed patch anchors never create a proposal or write
ok 27 - ambiguous, overlapping, missing and malformed patch anchors never create a proposal or write
---
duration_ms: 717.7812
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: stale original hashes and changes before apply preserve owner edits and mark conflicts
ok 28 - stale original hashes and changes before apply preserve owner edits and mark conflicts
---
duration_ms: 896.25
type: 'test'
...
# Subtest: no-op BOM patches/full content produce no change and replacements cannot split Unicode bytes
ok 29 - no-op BOM patches/full content produce no change and replacements cannot split Unicode bytes
---
duration_ms: 663.8407
type: 'test'
...
1..29
# tests 29
# suites 0
# pass 29
# fail 0
# cancelled 0
# skipped 0
# todo 0
# duration_ms 22801.3311
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{
"success": true,
"version": "1.12.1",
"startedAt": "2026-10-30T15:26:30.086Z",
"finishedAt": "2026-10-30T15:26:52.939Z",
"directory": "D:\\Ai-project\\REA逆向\\Agent-Workbench\\.qa\\milestone-path-followup-4acaee3b-bfba-4dce-acfe-0d1bda2cba13",
"files": [
"tests/file-boundaries.test.mjs",
"tests/files.test.mjs",
"tests/patch.test.mjs",
"tests/code-tools.test.mjs",
"tests/change-sets.test.mjs"
],
"code": 0,
"tests": {
"tests": 29,
"pass": 29,
"fail": 0,
"cancelled": 0,
"skipped": 0,
"todo": 0
},
"log": {
"path": "D:\\Ai-project\\REA逆向\\Agent-Workbench\\.qa\\milestone-path-followup-4acaee3b-bfba-4dce-acfe-0d1bda2cba13\\tests.tap",
"bytes": 7708,
"sha256": "875bc7cebd4893db0468901b4af234b2c684c08a6d52cb5a9d0b53d30ea1176e"
},
"realModelRequests": 0
}
+7 -1
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ export function safePath(project, relative = '', allowMissing = false) {
// A project-local link or Windows alias must not turn a public path into
// access to protected Git metadata or credentials, including new files.
if (restricted(path.relative(root, real))) throw new Error('实际路径指向受保护的项目目录或凭据。');
const actual = fs.statSync(real);
// realpath cannot reveal the other names of a hard-linked file. Refuse
// ambiguous file scope before reading bytes or preparing a replacement.
if (actual.isFile() && actual.nlink !== 1) throw new Error('硬链接文件有多个路径,无法核对完整作用范围;请使用独立文件副本。');
return target;
}
@@ -65,8 +69,10 @@ export function listFiles(project, relative = '', depth = 4, limit = 700) {
const relativePath = path.relative(project.root, absolute).replaceAll('\\', '/');
if (entry.isSymbolicLink()) continue;
const directory = entry.isDirectory();
const info = directory ? null : fs.statSync(absolute);
if (!directory && (!info.isFile() || info.nlink !== 1)) continue;
files.push({ path: relativePath, name: entry.name, kind: directory ? 'directory' : 'file',
bytes: directory ? 0 : fs.statSync(absolute).size });
bytes: directory ? 0 : info.size });
if (files.length >= limit) { truncated = true; break; }
if (directory && current.depth < Math.min(12, Math.max(0, depth))) queue.push({ absolute, depth: current.depth + 1 });
}
+7 -2
View File
@@ -60,8 +60,13 @@ test('duplicate canonical paths, ancestor collisions, links, dependencies and Wi
const dependency = proposeFile(f.store, f.session, { path: 'node_modules/owned.txt', content: 'dependency', reason: 'excluded' });
await assert.rejects(b.manager.prepare(f.session, [dependency.change_id]), /普通源码/);
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
const windows = proposeFile(f.store, f.session, { path: 'src/one.mjs.', content: 'alias', reason: 'windows alias' });
await assert.rejects(b.manager.prepare(f.session, [windows.change_id]), /路径别名/);
assert.throws(() => proposeFile(f.store, f.session, { path: 'src/one.mjs.', content: 'alias', reason: 'windows alias' }), /可读取的项目范围/);
// A proposal retained from an older host must still be refused by batch
// validation even though the current proposal API now rejects it earlier.
const retained = f.session.changes.find(value => value.id === alias.change_id), originalPath = retained.path;
retained.path = 'src/one.mjs.';
try { await assert.rejects(b.manager.prepare(f.session, [retained.id]), /可读取的项目范围/); }
finally { retained.path = originalPath; }
}
assertBatchBytes(assert, f, b.before);
});
+34
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@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import { fixture } from './helpers.mjs';
import { readText, listFiles, proposeFile } from '../src/server/files.mjs';
import { inspectProject } from '../src/core/project-inspector.mjs';
test('hard-link aliases cannot expose protected bytes through reads, proposals, inventory or automatic project rules', async t => {
const f = fixture(t);
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.git')); fs.mkdirSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.secrets'));
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.git/config'), '[core]\nrepositoryformatversion = 0\n');
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.secrets/owned.txt'), 'owned-protected-rule-marker');
fs.linkSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.git/config'), path.join(f.projectRoot, 'public-config.txt'));
fs.linkSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.secrets/owned.txt'), path.join(f.projectRoot, 'AGENTS.md'));
for (const filename of ['public-config.txt', 'AGENTS.md']) {
assert.throws(() => readText(f.project, filename), /硬链接/);
assert.throws(() => proposeFile(f.store, f.session, { path: filename, content: 'new bytes' }), /硬链接/);
}
const inventory = listFiles(f.project); assert.ok(!inventory.files.some(value => ['public-config.txt', 'AGENTS.md'].includes(value.path)));
const inspection = await inspectProject(f.project); assert.equal(inspection.rules.length, 0);
assert.equal(JSON.stringify(inspection).includes('owned-protected-rule-marker'), false);
assert.equal(fs.readFileSync(path.join(f.projectRoot, '.secrets/owned.txt'), 'utf8'), 'owned-protected-rule-marker');
});
test('ambiguous project hard links are explicit and ordinary independent file copies remain readable', t => {
const f = fixture(t), original = path.join(f.projectRoot, 'README.md'), alias = path.join(f.projectRoot, 'alias.md');
fs.linkSync(original, alias);
assert.throws(() => readText(f.project, 'README.md'), /独立文件副本/); assert.throws(() => readText(f.project, 'alias.md'), /硬链接/);
fs.unlinkSync(alias); fs.copyFileSync(original, alias);
assert.match(readText(f.project, 'README.md').content, /Fixture project/);
assert.match(readText(f.project, 'alias.md').content, /Fixture project/);
assert.ok(listFiles(f.project).files.some(value => value.path === 'alias.md'));
});